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Figure 1 Azidothymidine 
Source: J. Org. Chem., 1964 
In 1964, Jerome Horwitz and his colleagues created an 
azido analog of thymidine that would insert itself into cancer 
cells and stop the DNA from replicating, but after failed testing 
with mice, the drug was put on a shelf for over two decades 
(see figure 1).1 In the mid-1980s, the company, Burroughs 
Wellcome (now GlaxoSmithKline, or GSK), bought the rights 
to the drug, and on March 19, 1987, after only three and a half 
months of research and development, GSK received permission 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to use azidothymidine as a treatment for human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).2 The price was to be set at $10,000 for one year of treatment.3 
After calculating for inflation, one year of treatment would be equal to over $20,000 in 2017.4 
GSK and pharmaceutical companies alike are allowed to have complete control over price due to 
regulations put in place by the FDA that allow “inherent monopoly rights to the drug’s 
production and marketing.”5 Therefore, the distribution and cost are completely up to the for-
profit organization.  
Drug monopolies caused by patent laws in turn do not allow generic versions of these 
medications to be made. In 1991, GSK sued Barr Laboratory scientists who tried to sell 
azidothymidine as a generic drug. The case was appealed, and in 1992 the United States Court of 
                                               
1 Horwitz, J. P., Chua, J., & Noel, M, Nucleosides. V. The Monomesylates of  
1-(2'-Deoxy-β-D-lyxofuranosyl) thymine (1964, July).  
2 Broder, S, The development of antiretroviral therapy and its impact on the  
HIV-1/AIDS pandemic. (2010, January). 
3 Yarnell, A. (n.d.). AZT. (2005, May) 
4 CPI Inflation Calculator. (n.d.) 
5 Amado, R., & Gewertz, N. M. Intellectual Property and the Pharmaceutical Industry. (2004) 
295-308 
1
Dewey: Overpriced and Under Regulated
Published by Scholars' Mine, 2018
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of GSK maintaining complete control over the 
drug; this paved the way for future patent lawsuits.6 The purpose of this study was to evaluate 
patents, profit margins, salary increases, and lawsuits filed against pharmaceutical companies to 
determine if the current state of drug patent law allows companies to take advantage of 
prescription-dependent patients in order to make a larger profit.  
 
Methods and Results 
This study compared information from both lawsuits and government records as well as a 
group of select research papers regarding patent layering to determine whether the current state 
of drug regulation allows companies to cripple competition and use the money for financial gain. 
Using the FDA as a source for all patent and market exclusivity laws, as well as university 
databases for the scholarly journals, a conclusion was made on how the Supreme Court has 
reacted to pharmaceutical lawsuits. More importantly, a conclusion was drawn on how 
pharmaceutical companies use loopholes to extend exclusivity and the length of their patents. 
Government documents such as proxy statements and files from several agencies have also 
helped provide profit, salary, and lawsuits records filed against large pharmaceutical companies 
for price gouging. These lawsuits have led to evidence of large pharmaceutical companies’ 
malfeasance; looking into these cases of executive corruption has also aided in determining the 
legitimacy of the claims made by pharmaceutical companies. Finally, using the mission 
statements of pharmaceutical companies and the FDA, as well as literature reviews regarding 
price gouging, it is abundantly clear that these companies take advantage of loose patent laws in 
order to maintain their monopolies and control price. 
                                               
6 Armstrong, M., & Murphy, G. M. Inventorship and Ownership Considerations and  
Pitfalls with Collaborative Research. (2012), 349-351 
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Patent Laws and Exclusivity 
According to their website, the FDA’s mission statement is “protecting the public health 
by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, 
and medical devices” as well as regulating the manufacturing and distribution of these items. 
One part of this responsibility is writing the patent and exclusivity laws.7 Currently, the period 
for a drug patent is twenty years, but by layering multiple patents and delaying the court, 
pharmaceutical companies keep them much longer.8 When drug companies first apply to the 
FDA for a pharmaceutical patent, the item they are trying to claim as intellectual property is 
called a genus. A genus contains a set of compound subspecies that share similar characteristics, 
but this means that for the next twenty years, no generic drugs can be formed from any 
subspecies.9 
 During those twenty years, these companies can narrow down the subspecies in claims 
that they have made a better commercial product and refile for a new patent; this is known as 
double patenting. Although the FDA has a doctrine in place to stop companies from being 
granted a second patent, “the Federal Circuit has weakened the double patenting doctrine and 
removed it from its historical Supreme Court roots. This has allowed pharmaceutical companies 
to obtain second patents for compositions covered by their earlier patents and in turn allows for 
extension to their exclusive rights beyond the term permitted for a single patent”.10 Lilly and Co. 
(the manufacturer of Prozac, an extremely common antidepressant) was recently called out by 
                                               
7 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Mission Statement/What we do (2018).  
8 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Frequently asked questions (2018) 
9 Rogers, Douglas L, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress  
Competition. (2015) 
10 Douglas, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress  
Competition; United States Patent and Trademark Office, M. Definition of Double Patenting. 
(2015, July). 
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Barr Laboratories for trying to do just that.11 Their first patent “claimed a method for treating 
anxiety in a human by administering an effective amount of fluoxetine or a pharmaceutically-
acceptable salt thereof,” and the second claimed “a method of blocking the uptake of serotonin 
by brain neurons in animals by administering the compound fluoxetine hydrochloride.”12 The 
court claimed this was obvious type double patenting and the patent was denied, yet for the 
period of time before the decision was final, Lilly and Co. continued to reap the benefits of total 
price control.13 When a company succeeds at this, it can delay the FDA until the patent is found 
to be indistinct from previous patents. While this may only last a short time, it can still be 
extremely profitable.  
Exclusivity is another way of drawing out the time in which companies can retain the 
rights to their drugs. The FDA recognizes multiple types of exclusivity, including orphan drug 
exclusivity which lasts seven years, new chemical entity exclusivity which lasts five years, 
generating antibiotic incentives now exclusivity which lasts five years, new clinical investigation 
exclusivity which lasts three years, pediatric exclusivity which adds six months, and finally 
patent challenge which lasts 180 days for abbreviated new drug applications only.14 An example 
of new chemical entity exclusivity would be “AbbVie Inc., [who] received a patent for a broad 
method of treating rheumatoid arthritis with methotrexate and an antibody, and in 2010 it 
received a patent for a narrower method- within the scope of the original patent-of treating 
arthritis with methotrexate and an antibody, allowing AbbVie to extend its exclusive rights to the 
narrower method from 2012 to 2018.”15 By manipulating these exclusivity laws, AbbVie was 
                                               
11 Cornwell, G. Post PLIVA v. Mensing liability for generic medicine manufacturers. (2013) 
230-234. 
12 Cornwell, Mensing liability for generic medicine manufacturers. 
13 Cornwell, Mensing liability for generic medicine manufacturers. 
14 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Frequently asked questions. 
15 Douglas, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress  
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able to bypass their patent expiration date and continue their monopoly over the use of 
methotrexate as a drug for arthritis.  
The FDA also mentions that “exclusivity was designed to promote a balance between 
new drug innovation and greater public access to drugs that result from generic drug 
competition,”16 yet “the former editor in chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, wrote 
that ‘the pharmaceutical industry is not especially innovative’ and added that from 1998 through 
2002, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 415 new drugs, but only 14 percent 
were truly innovative.”17 This data proves a lack of advancement in drug research and 
development and a focus on simply extending patents. Later “the President's Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology said that ‘the pace of new therapeutic development has not kept up 
with the explosion in scientific knowledge’ and observed, ‘The number of novel drugs has 
remained constant for several decades, even as R&D budgets have substantially increased’”.18 
This lack of development of better versions of medication, and instead a push to simply extend 
the rights of a so called ‘new drug,’ show the real motivation behind pharmaceutical companies. 
These submarine patent tactics have been used countless times throughout the last thirty 
years to help pharmaceutical companies retain their rights over the drugs they own, so that they 
can continue their monopoly over the price. While these regulations are said to be put in place 
for balance between competition and recouping for research and development costs, it is clear 
that they are consistently used by pharmaceutical companies to extend their rights to their drugs. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Competition. 
16 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Frequently asked questions. 
17 Douglas, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress  
Competition. 
18 Douglas, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress  
Competition. 
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Innovations being made by these companies are not substantial enough to warrant such loose 
patent laws. 
Lawsuits and Scandals  
Making sure patients who have debilitating illnesses can receive their medication for as 
little as possible is the main incentive behind questioning the legitimacy of the use of patent law 
for pharmaceutical drug companies. Delving into cases of executive corruption as well as 
lawsuits filed against these companies has provided insight into figuring out the legitimacy of the 
claims made by pharmaceutical companies.  
In 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals (founded by Martin Shkreli) purchased the patent rights 
to Pyrimethamine (brand named Daraprim), a drug synthesized in 1983 by Gertrude Elion.19 
After gaining market exclusivity by purchase, Turing raised the price of Daraprim from $13.50 
per pill to $750 per pill overnight.20 At the time, Daraprim was “affordable, readily available, 
and very effective at treating toxoplasmosis in people with HIV/AIDS, cancer, or other 
conditions that cause compromised immune systems,” yet after purchasing the drug and putting 
no funding into research and development, Turing raised the price of the drug 5,000%.21 When 
Shkreli was confronted by the New York times on why this price increase took place, he said, 
“This isn’t the greedy drug company trying to gouge patients, it is us trying to stay in 
                                               
19 Impax Laboratories v. Turing Pharmaceuticals AG, united states district court, southern  
district of New York. 1:16-cv-03241(NY.2016); Vasudevan, D., Textbook of 
biochemistry (2016) 
20 Documents Obtained by Committee from Turing Pharmaceuticals, Committee on  
Government Oversight and Reform, 2016. 
21 Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, 2016. 
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business.”22 However, “on August 27, 2015, Mr. Shkreli sent an email to another outside contact, 
writing, ‘I think it will be huge. We raised the price from $1,700 per bottle to $75,000 … So 
5,000 paying bottles at the new price is $375,000,000—almost all of it is profit and I think we 
will get 3 years of that or more. Should be a very handsome investment for all of us. Let’s all 
cross our fingers that the estimates are accurate.’”.23  To add to this, one year prior to the price 
gouge, Shkreli was indicted for misrepresenting his shareholders, stealing investment funds, and 
committing investor fraud against MSMB capital.24 After the Daraprim scandal, Shkreli “used 
his control over Retrophin [parent company of Turing Pharmaceuticals] to enrich himself and to 
pay off claims of MSMB investors (whom he had defrauded).”25 These actions are shady 
business practices whose sole interest is profit. Price gouging to pay defrauded investors and 
taking advantage of patients who rely on Daraprim to survive are not actions of a company 
whose primary mission is to “support programs that assist patients who may have difficulty 
affording their treatment and [give] discounts to organizations that provide care to underserved 
patients.”26 These instances of price gouging are certainly not ethically sound decisions for 
companies claiming to serve their customers. 
Shkreli does not stand alone by any means; lawsuits involving executive corruption and 
price gouging are common practice among large pharmaceutical companies. In 1999, the large 
company Mylan Laboratories was handed a 100-million-dollar lawsuit for increasing the price of 
their drugs, including lorazepam and clorazepate. According to the accusations, some of the 
                                               
22 Pollack, A. (2015, September 20). Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight. 
(2015) 
23 Committee on Government Oversight and Reform 
24 LLC v. SEC. U.S District Court, Eastern District of New York 1:15-cv-07175 (2015) 
25 Impax Laboratories v. Turing Pharmaceuticals 1:16-cv-03241(NY.2016) 
26  Vyera Pharmaceuticals, OUR MISSION. (n.d.). (2018) 
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drugs prices were raised upwards of 2,000%.27 Mylan was also indicted for a price increase of 
over 4,000% on albuterol sulfate tablets, a drug that had been around for more than two 
decades.28 More recently, Mylan purchased the rights to Auvi-q, more commonly known as an 
EpiPen. After jacking the price up more than 400%, Mylan was sued for trying to squash 
competition and implement illegal price increases.29 Another example is the large pharmaceutical 
company Pfizer, which was part of the largest account of healthcare fraud in history, with a 
payout of over two billion dollars.30 It is clear that monetary payouts have no effect on how these 
companies do business, as the countless examples of fraud and obvious manipulation of 
exclusivity laws only result in a payout that is just a fraction of their yearly profit. These tactics 
used by Mylan, Pfizer, and other large pharmaceutical companies show that they only have profit 
in mind and are not looking out for the health and wellbeing of patients. 
Effect of Profit Margins and Price Gouging 
  Although it is clear that currently released drugs cannot be considered innovative, there 
are still problems that arise in research and development. “Only five of every four thousand 
laboratory compounds ever merits human testing. Of these five, only one ever becomes a drug 
for sale.”31 Many companies argue this is one of the reasons for the high prices of life saving 
drugs, as the majority of their revenue goes back into research and development. In 2016, after 
the EpiPen Price gouge, Mylan CEO Heather Bresch told CNBC that high costs are due to 
                                               
27 Marie Price The, J. R., State to share in $100 million settlement.  (2001, Feb 02). 
28 Mylan Inc v. Self-Insured Schools of California. United States District Court, Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. Case 2:17-cv-02158-CMR. (PA 2017). 
29 MYLAN Inc.; and MYLAN SPECIALTY, L.P v. SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC. United 
 States District Court for New Jersey. Case 3:17-cv-02763-FLW-TJB, (NJ 2017) 
30  Michael L. Loucks, District of Massachusetts, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCES  
LARGEST HEALTH CARE FRAUD SETTLEMENT IN ITS HISTORY. (2009). 
31 PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING: HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH? (n.d.). Harvard law. 
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“manufacturing the product, distributing the product, enhancing the product, investing.”32 Yet, 
over the course of 10 years, Ms. Bresch raised the price of one dose of epinephrine from $56.64 
to $317.82, a 461% increase.33 According to the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Ms. Bresch made $2,453,456 in 2007; 10 years later after her price gouge, she was 
compensated with $18,931,068 for just one year.34 From 1980 to 1990 the median profit margin 
for pharmaceutical companies was 21.1%. For comparison, the median profit margin for 
manufacturing companies was only 11.9%, and profit margins have only increased. The Fortune 
500 list of 2014 put Pfizer’s profit margins at over 40%.35 With an average of double the profit 
margin of other industries, it is clear that the sole reason for price gouging is not to recoup the 
costs of research and development. Instead, pharmaceutical companies have a fixation on large 
profits and personal compensation. 
 Price gouging drugs to reap high profit margins and personal financial growth have more 
than just an effect on consumer price. “On September 30, 2015, a Turing sales account manager 
sent an email about a recent meeting with Massachusetts General Hospital, writing: “‘One of the 
things we discussed was Mass General’s internal analysis of the impact of Daraprim’s new price 
on their inpatient pharmacy budget, which they have determined to be prohibitively expensive. 
Against their clinical convictions they are currently switching patients to Bactrim.’”36 The price 
of Daraprim was raised so high that one of the largest teaching hospitals for Harvard medical 
                                               
32 Dan Mangan, Anita Balakrishnan. Mylan CEO Bresch: 'No one's more frustrated than me'  
about EpiPen price furor’. 
33 MYLAN Inc.; and MYLAN SPECIALTY, L.P v. SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC. Case 3:17-
cv-02763-FLW-TJB, (NJ 2017) 
34 Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the 
Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2015. Commission file number 333-199861; Mylan Inc. Proxy 
statement. SCHEDULE 14A (Rule 14a-101). DEF 14A 1 l39062def14a.htm DEF 14A. 
35 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers in the 2014 Fortune 500 list; MYLAN Inc.; and MYLAN 
SPECIALTY, L.P v. SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC. Case 3:17-cv-02763-FLW-TJB, (NJ 2017) 
36 Documents Obtained by Committee from Turing Pharmaceuticals, 2016. 
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students had to switch to a medicine that is less successful at treating toxoplasmosis. The record 
from the Impax v. Turing states that “Daraprim has now become prohibitively expensive, 
hospital budgets are straining under the huge cost increases, patients are being forced to pay 
thousands of dollars in co-pays and are experiencing major challenges obtaining access to the 
drug, and physicians are considering using alternative therapies.”37 While Mylan claims to have 
“medicines available to everyone who needs them,” healthcare suppliers such as hospitals are 
unable to give the best care to their patients due to high price gouges created by patent laws.38 
Discussion 
Patent laws allow pharmaceutical companies to hold complete control over the 
manufacturing and price of all species covered by the patent over the genus. This, along with 
market exclusivity regulations put in place by the FDA, causes any generic competition to be 
illegal. Using double patenting, patent layering, submarine patents, metabolite patents, 
polymorph patents, and many more patent-extending loopholes, drug companies are able to hold 
patents and market exclusivity much longer than the FDA allows. 
These instances of extended market exclusivity have led to innumerable lawsuits and 
scandals stemming from illegal price jacks, healthcare and investment fraud, misrepresentation, 
and incorrectly filing for a second patent. These lawsuits, along with the scandals involving the 
CEOs and founders of these companies, are all evidence that the regulations regarding patent 
laws allow companies to take advantage of loose regulations in order to have as much fiscal 
influence and financial gain as possible. When comparing companies’ high profit margins and 
price gouging, and cross referencing it to salary increases over that period, it becomes clear that 
the motivation behind this price gouging is profit. High profit margins are evidence that money is 
                                               
37 Impax Laboratories v. Turing Pharmaceuticals AG, 1:16-cv-03241 (NY.2016) 
38 Mylan Worldwide. (n.d.). 
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not being properly funded back into research and development, but instead used for personal 
financial gain.  
All of this is a result of loose patent regulations. Tightening these laws could result in 
massive influxes of competition, which in turn could cause an overall decrease in the price of 
life-saving medication. In the last ten years, Pfizer and Mylan have raised the price of many 
drugs and there seems to be no end in sight. Cheaper medicine could result in cheaper healthcare, 
which would allow patients to pay less to keep themselves in good health. In the end, the most 
important reason for studying the malfeasance of pharmaceutical companies is to not allow them 
to take advantage of and profit from sick patients. More research needs to be done on how to 
properly tighten the regulations put in place by the FDA to ensure double patenting and patent 
layering cannot happen as frequently as it does now. Until action is taken, patients and hospitals 
will continue to be strained by monopoly prices, and billion-dollar pharmaceutical companies 
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